May 11, 2025:
Increasingly, Ukrainian drone operators are witnessing Russian soldiers executing Ukrainian prisoners of war. This is not unusual in any war, but in Ukraine the constant presence of drones allows the executions to be filmed and shown to the world. Less publicized is the Ukrainian revenge, when Russians who killed Ukrainian prisoners are themselves attacked by Ukrainian drones and killed. This doesn’t happen often enough to discourage the murder of prisoners.
Russian officers condone, encourage and sometimes order these executions. Since the Russian invasion in 2022 through the end of December 2024 there were 177 Ukrainian prisoners of war killed. In the first three months of 2025 at least 25 captured Ukrainian soldiers have been murdered. Since the end of August 2024 there were at least 29 incidents where Russian soldiers killed a total of 91 Ukrainian prisoners. The Russians don’t try to hide their behavior. In one case a Russian officer deliberately had the murder of Ukrainian prisoners filmed. This video showed up on worldwide social media. Ukrainian soldiers have murdered Russian prisoners a few times and the Russians didn’t seem to care. Early in the war Russian officers were told they could shoot any of their soldiers who refused to fight or tried to desert.
Part of the problem is the way the war has been going. The situation has gotten steadily worse for Russian forces. By early 2025 Russia has lost over a million men dead, wounded, deserted or fleeing the country to avoid military service. Russia recruited prisoners and anyone else using large cash payments. These men soon found that few of them would survive more than a few months in Ukraine. The bonus cash is still offered but there are fewer men willing to take money and die quickly.
By 2025 the war had a very bad and well-earned reputation as a failure. This started early, six months into the war, when Russian forces were on the defensive. Since then, Ukrainian troops were surprised by a rapid Russian revival and a slugfest began that continues to the present.
The Russian military turned out to be, to paraphrase a 1940s maxim, a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma. At times Russian troops not only failed to defend themselves, but surrendered in large numbers or fled, leaving their undamaged armored vehicles behind. High resolution commercial satellite photos of the battlefield appeared regularly and allowed an international network of civilians to scrutinize the photos and pool their accurate accountings of vehicle losses on both sides. Russia lost most of the vehicles, especially the armored ones, they sent into Ukraine. Russian vehicle losses were four times those of the Ukrainians, and Ukraine actively recovered and repaired damaged vehicles belonging to both sides because it won most battles and controlled the battlefields afterwards.
A unique feature of this war was that both sides were using the same armored vehicles. That was because, until 1991 Russia and Ukraine were both part of the Soviet Union and Ukraine was a major center for Soviet armored vehicle design and production. About half the Russian armor losses were vehicles that were abandoned or captured intact. Because of a flaw in their auto-loader design, there were few damaged tanks because any armor penetrations usually caused the vehicle to explode, often with such force that the turret was separated from the tank. The Ukrainians had anti-tank missiles with top-attack capability, which usually destroyed the Russian tanks being attacked.
It was noted that 125mm tank gunfire was actually less lethal, especially when that 125mm shell was fired by a crew of poorly trained and inexperienced Russians. Worse, Russian troops quickly noticed their tanks were easily destroyed by the Ukrainians so most Russian tank crews would abandon their vehicles once they realized their unit was under attack. By the end of 2022 Ukraine was able to deploy a larger and more effective tank force than the Russians. Ukraine also came up with ways to defeat the Russian artillery and air force superiority. Seven months into the war it was clear that Ukraine’s counter-offensive was continuing and the Ukrainian mobile force of tanks and other armored vehicles expanded as the Ukrainians put their growing number of captured Russian vehicles into Ukrainian service. This usually took a few days, at most, as each vehicle was checked out, repairs made and the vehicle repainted to remove the prominent white Z that identified all Russian vehicles with the Ukrainian V, often with a Ukrainian flag on the radio aerial.
Ukraine used more effective tactics, maintained the vehicles better than the Russians did and suffered a sixth of the Russian casualties. The Ukrainians were operating in friendly territory, where the Russians were watched by Ukrainian civilians, who used their cellphone to report what was happening to Ukrainian commanders. The Ukrainians had developed better battlefield communications while Russian combat leadership and support services were very bad. Ukrainian troops received regular supplies of food, medical care and the support of local civilians. This was especially true in areas where the Russians had recently been driven out.
The Russians had a shortage of effective combat leadership from the beginning but it got worse year after year as Russian officers suffered higher losses than their reluctant troops. Two months after the war started Russia sent the instructor staff from all their junior officer training schools into the fighting. During the first year of the war Russian officers were too few, too inexperienced and too incompetent to provide effective leadership. There were a few exceptions, but over ninety percent of Russian troops and their officers were ineffective and often fled or surrendered, even if the Russians were on the defensive. This would occur even if Russian troops were inside fortifications and facing advancing Ukrainians.
Russia sought to force former soldiers to join, as well as anyone else the recruiters could catch. While still in Russia these men were given uniforms, assault rifles and, in many cases, only a few days of training. Those with previous experience were formed into tank crews or assigned to operate other armored vehicles. There were no longer enough trucks to support Russian forces, even with civilian trucks taken from firms idle because of the sanctions. Later in the war, Russian troops pilfered Ukrainian horses, donkeys and mules to move their supplies to the front line.
From the beginning of the war, the Ukrainians went after Russian trucks, especially fuel tankers. These trucks were carrying supplies and Russia has been unable to replace its truck losses or maintain the flow of supplies to its forces in Ukraine. When the weather turned colder in southern Ukraine, most Russian troops didn't have cold-weather clothing. They looted heavy coats and other items from Ukrainian civilians but that has been difficult because the civilians fled when the Russians got close, taking their warm clothing with them. In the end Russian officers realized that soldiers wearing civilian clothing was not a good idea.
A year into the war Russian troops had to face a new and unexpected terror. Ukrainians unleashed swarms of First Person View/FPV drones that revolutionized how wars are fought. There were few methods to defeat drone attacks. The primary defensive measure developed is electronic jamming of the control signal between the drone operator and the drone. Jamming is of limited effectiveness because active jammers are easy targets for drones programmed to detect, home in on and destroy jammers. Depending on how they are programmed, drones will either land if jammed or return to where they were launched.
Despite those defensive measures, and the small explosive payload drones carry, about half the armored vehicles damaged or destroyed in Ukraine were done in by armed drones. By the end of 2024 most Russian and Ukrainian casualties were caused by drones. This form of combat was increasingly common and dominating most combat zones. Tactics and techniques also evolved as Ukraine and Russia both experimented with new tactics, techniques, and drone designs. Both nations increased production of drones and the number of trained operators. Both Russia and Ukraine realized that drones provide unprecedented surveillance of the battlefield, but not all of it. That requires more drones and operators. One solution for this shortcoming is operator software that enables one operator to control several drones. The number one operator can handle simultaneously depends on operator experience. That cannot be manufactured but must be developed. Whoever can obtain the most and best trained operators has an advantage.
All these drone developments make combat more dangerous for the troops on the ground. Drones not only keep an eye on enemy troops but are always ready to go in and put them out of action, as in dead or wounded. Troops are still fighting each other on the ground, but now they have to worry about constant surveillance and attacks from the growing number of drones hovering above them.
In addition to operators there are the drone maintainers, who repair damaged or otherwise disabled drones and service those needing a battery recharge or simply a fresh battery. Drones were one of many surprising developments in the Ukraine war, and the Russian invaders eventually became demoralized and reluctant to fight. Their leader, Vladimir Putin, insisted he would keep fighting until Ukraine was part of Russia. When faced with reluctant soldiers, Putin imported several brigades of North Korea mercenaries. Unprepared for this new form of warfare, most of the North Koreans soon became casualties. Putin is currently desperate for a way out of the mess he created. While the Americans have offered to broker a peace deal, the Ukrainians smell victory and insist on continuing to drive all Russian soldiers out. That may work, if only because nothing else has.