May 2, 2026:
Why didn’t the Iranian revert to Islamic terrorism during the war? The Americans have long depicted Iran as the major nation the leading state champion of state supported terrorism. Iran used both the IRGC/Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps IRGC, the state entity the Americans had designated, and an array of terrorist groups, such as the Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis in Yemen, as substitutes. Iran and Iranian-backed proxies have conducted or attempted attacks in Argentina, Bahrain, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Germany, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, America, and other countries. This history spans decades and includes both spectacular international attacks and more limited operations designed to signal resolve without triggering full-scale war.
Given this track record, it would be reasonable to think that Iran would use terrorism in its 2026 war with Israel and the United States, both of which declared government change as one of their goals, a truly realistic threat to Iran’s leaders. Yet, so far at least, Iran has not used terrorism even though it has launched rocket, missile, and drone attacks on civilian as well as military targets in the region and closed the Strait of Hormuz.
What explains this surprising lack of terrorism? It’s difficult to know why something didn’t happen, but there are several nonexclusive options. Each points to a different limitation on Iranian judgements, ranging from operational limits to strategic restraint.
Perhaps the simplest justification is the best; Iran did not conduct terrorist attacks on the Americans and its allies because it was not able to do so. The Israeli and American attacks on Iran, especially the assassination campaign that killed over 250 senior Iranian political and military leaders, demonstrated a remarkable intelligence penetration of Iran. Although the intelligence required to target leaders differs from that necessary to disrupt operations, it is plausible that some of the techniques that led to the assassinations also revealed information on terrorist operations, allowing for disruption. Equally important, Iran itself was probably running scared, believing that its operations and networks might be penetrated even if they were not. It is also likely that the assassination campaign disrupted command and control, making it difficult to organize and direct operations while also hiding from American and Israeli airstrikes. In this sense, the absence of terrorism may reflect not restraint but temporary inability, an intelligence-driven suppression of Iran’s external networks at a significant moment.
A second possibility is that Iran feared escalation and retaliation from the Americans and Israel. That may seem an odd fear given the firepower unleashed in Operations Epic Fury and Lion’s Roar/the Israeli equivalent. The Americans, however, could easily have inflicted more damage on Iran. The American president was already promising to unleash destruction on an entire civilization and attack power plants and bridges, and the Americans were also sending ground forces to the Gulf region. Terrorism, particularly against the American homeland or high-profile civilian targets, risked converting a limited war into a far broader and more existential conflict for the Iranian government.
A related third possibility is the risk of blowback for Iran. The Iran war was unpopular in America, but a terrorist attack could bolster support, creating a casus belli where one was previously lacking. The conflict was even less popular in Europe and Asia, but terrorist attacks there might increase hostility toward Iran and thus support for American and Israeli attacks. Rather than dividing Iran’s adversaries, terrorism might unify them, strengthening political will, legitimizing escalation, and undermining Iran’s efforts to portray itself as a victim of aggression.
Another possibility is the most unattractive, that such attacks are in the pipeline but just haven’t happened yet. Revenge, like ice cream, is best served cold. Iran waited over a year to begin a plot to kill a former American National Security because of his role in the American assassination of IRGC Quds Force leader Qasem Soleimani. That American violence pales by comparison to the scale of the 2026 killings, including the assassination of Iran’s supreme leader, intelligence chief, head of the IRGC, and many others. Iran may simply be looking for the right opportunity to exact revenge, perhaps waiting until the conflict is completely over and the risk of escalation is lower.
A final possibility is that Iranian leaders believe that they do not need to use terrorism because their current response has succeeded. Drone strikes, missile attacks, shipping disruption, and proxy warfare have already allowed Iran to impose costs and create an effective deterrent for the resumption of the war. In this context, terrorism may have been redundant, offering limited additional influence while carrying disproportionate risks.
Taken together, these explanations suggest that Iran’s restraint is contingent rather than permanent. Whether due to capability constraints, strategic caution, or timing, the underlying logic that has long driven Iran’s use of terrorism may simply be dormant, for now.