April 19, 2025: On February 2nd two American B-1B bombers bombed targets in Syria and Iraq. This was in retaliation for an Iranian-sponsored attack on the U.S. Tower 22 supply facility Jordan. An Iran-backed group used armed drones to kill three American soldiers and wound 40 others. The B-1Bs flew from a base in the United States and returned there after the mission was completed. Total time in the air was 34 hours and the mission covered about 45,000 kilometers.

This air strike, and many earlier ones, was an example of the U.S. Air Force Global Strike capability. This capability has been evolving since the U.S. Air Force was established in 1947. Formerly the U.S. Army Air Forces, both these organizations regularly used long range strike missions. In 2003 the Department of Defense's Strategic Command or STRATCOM got four new jobs. These included global strike with long range bombers or ICBMs. In addition work continued on integrated missile defenses, integrated information operations by collecting and using information collected via satellites or America's worldwide network of listening stations, and global command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. STRATCOM merged with the Strategic Command, which controlled ICBMs and long range bombers carrying nuclear weapons.

STRATCOM worked with Space Command that controlled space satellites and space operations in general. The new STRATCOM had to develop techniques for working with other areas of the Department of Defense. The main reason for putting all these jobs into STRATCOM was because of the need to eliminate competing bureaucracies and insure that needed information was collected and distributed in a timely manner.

In 2005 the air force received several B-52 and B-2 bombers to serve as the Global Strike Force. This meant that one or more of these aircraft were on alert and ready to take off immediately, and put bombs on any target on the planet, within twelve hours of getting the order. This assignment was mainly directed at Iran and North Korea, because of the nuclear weapons development programs underway there. The Global Strike bombers could arrive overhead with nukes of their own, if the situation warranted it, but would most likely be armed with dozens of conventional smart bombs.

In 2009 air force revived SAC or Strategic Air Command as the Global Strike Command. SAC was disbanded in 1992 because it became unemployed when the Cold War ended in 1991. Then, because of a number of embarrassing problems with nuclear weapons security over a three years period, inspections became more strict and frequent. Scary inspections have become fashionable again, and commanders who didn’t get with the program were headed for early retirement. The word from on-high was that the units handling nuclear weapons had to be fanatics about nuclear safety and security. This is a switch from more laid-back post-Cold War practices.

All this was a return of the old SAC attitudes. After the first few mishaps handling nukes, many in the air force began trying to revive SAC. Why just act like SAC, when what is really needed is a revival of SAC. This is one of those rare cases where it is recognized that the good old days were better. Or, in this case; meaner, tougher, more effective and safer. The new Global Strike Command or GSC did what SAC once did. That meant control over all air force nuclear weapons and ICBM and heavy bomber delivery systems. This came after 17 years of trying to do without SAC.

In 1992, SAC, which had control of air force nuclear bombers and missiles since 1946, was disbanded and the ICBMs, and their crews, were transferred to the new Space Command. SAC had long been the butt of many jokes, for being uptight and fanatical about security and discipline. Everyone tolerated this because, after all, SAC had charge of all those nuclear weapons, heavy bombers and ICBMs. When Space Command took over, they eased up on the tight discipline and strictness about procedure that had been the hallmark of SAC for decades. The old timers complained, but many of the young troops liked the new, looser, attitudes.

Officers operating the ICBMs were no longer career missileers, but Space Command people. Time that used to be spent on studying nuclear weapons security and missile maintenance issues, was now devoted to subjects of more concern to Space Command like satellites and communications. Standards fell; efficiency slipped.

Then in 2005, the missile crews lost their Missile Badge, and had it replaced with a generic Space Command badge. Then there was much angst when it was discovered that six nuclear cruise missiles had accidentally been mounted on a B-52 and flown halfway across the country. How could this happen? The old timers knew. While many of these older officers and NCOs were pleased when SAC went away early in their careers, they knew that it was that act, and the subsequent loosening up, that led to the lax attitudes that put those six unnoticed nukes on that B-52. All this was part of a major, post-Cold War reorganization of the air force. It was the beginning of the end of a decades old tradition of handling nuclear weapons safely and securely.

Subsequently the air force brass reinstated the Missile Badge, for any missile crew member who belonged to a missile crew that was certified CMR by passing strenuous inspections and declared Combat Mission Ready. The badge was used for decades, until 2005, when it was withdrawn and replaced by the generic Space Wings of the Space Command, which took control of the ICBMs in 1993. SAC, it turns out, has been coming back quietly for quite some time. And now it's back for real, with a new name, but the same old attitudes.