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May 23, 2026: The Iranian IRGC/Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps is now in charge of Iran’s government. This means that after nine weeks of war with the Americans and Israel, the last Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was replaced by his son Mojtaba who was considered a lower ranking hojatoleslam. He may eventually be elevated to Ayatollah. This does not matter because the IRGC generals are now running the country.
Since its formation in 1979, the Islamic Republic has revolved around a supreme leader with final authority on all critical matters of state. The death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on the first day of the war, and the promotion of his wounded son, Mojtaba, have ushered in a dissimilar order dominated by commanders of the IRGC and marked by the dearth of a determined, respected referee.
Mojtaba Khamenei remains at the head of the system, but three people familiar with internal determinations say his role is largely to legitimize decisions made by his generals rather than issue commands himself.
Wartime pressure has concentrated power into a narrower, harder-line inner circle rooted in the SMSC/Supreme National Security Council , the Supreme Leader’s office and the IRGC, which now controls both military strategy and key political decisions, Iranian officials and analysts say.
The Iranians are painfully slow in their response, said a senior Pakistani leadership official briefed on peace talks between Iran and the Americans that Pakistan has been facilitating. There is apparently no one decision-making command structure. At times, it takes them two or three days to respond.
Specialists said the obstacle to a deal is not internal infighting in the Iranian capital, but the gap between what America is prepared to offer and what Iran’s hardline IRGC were prepared to accept.
The diplomatic face of Iran at the talks with the Americans has been the Iranian Foreign Minister, more recently joined by the Speaker of its parliament, who is a former IGRC commander, mayor of the Iranian capital and presidential candidate. This official has emerged during the war as a key medium between Iran’s political, security and clerical leaders. On the ground, however, the central interlocutor has been an IRGC commander. According to Pakistani and Iranian sources who identified him weeks ago as Iran’s pivotal figure, including on the night a ceasefire was announced.
Mojtaba Khamenei, who was severely injured in the opening Israeli and American attacks that killed his father and other relatives and left him scarred with serious leg wounds, has not appeared publicly and communicates through IRGC officials or limited audio links because of security restrictions, two people close to his inner circle said. There was no immediate reply from the Iranian foreign ministry to a request for comment on the issues raised in this article. Iranian officials have previously denied any divisions over negotiations with the Americans.
Iran recently submitted a new proposal to the Americans, which according to senior Iranian sources sees staged talks, with the nuclear issue to be set aside at the start until the war ends and disagreements over Gulf shipping are resolved. The Americans insist the nuclear issue must be tackled from the outset. Neither side wanted to negotiate, and both believed time would weaken the other, Iran through leverage over oil exports through the Straits of Hormuz and the Americans through economic pressure and a blockade of Iranian exports.
For now, neither side can afford to bend. The IRGC is suspicious of appearing weak to the Americans, while the American President faces midterm election pressure and little room for flexibility without political cost. For both sides, flexibility would be seen as vulnerability.
That caution reflects not just the pressures of the moment, but the way power is now exercised inside Iran. While Mojtaba is formally Iran’s ultimate authority, he is a figure of approval rather than command. Endorsing outcomes are forged through institutional consensus rather than imposition of authority from above. Real power, they say, has moved to a unified wartime leadership centered on the SNSC.
Important deals probably pass through Mojtaba Khamenei but it is unlikely that anyone will overrule the National Security Council. How could anyone go against those overseeing the war effort? Hardline figures such as the former nuclear negotiator and a cluster of radical members of parliament have raised their profile using forceful rhetoric during the war, but they lack the institutional authority to derail decisions or influence outcomes.
Mojtaba owes his elevation to the IRGC, who sidelined realists and backed him as a reliable guardian of their hardline agenda. Already strengthened by war, the IRGCs growing authority signals a more determined foreign policy and tighter domestic domination.
Driven by revolutionary Islamism and a security first worldview, the IRGC see their mission as preserving the Islamic Republic and their power at home while projecting power abroad. That outlook, often shared with hardliners across the judiciary and the clerical establishment, prioritizes rigid centralized control and resistance to foreign pressure, particularly on nuclear policy and Iran’s regional reach.
In practice, the IRGC philosophy shapes strategy and decisions. With the country at war and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei gone, no player inside the system has the power or scope to resist them even if they wished to, the people close to internal discussions said.
The choice facing Iran’s leadership is no longer between moderate and hardline policy, but between hardline and even harder line. A small faction may argue for pushing further still, but even that impulse has so far been kept in check by the IRGC.
The shift marks a decisive reordering of power from clerical primacy to security dominance. They’ve gone from divine power to hard power. From the influence of the clerics to the influence of the IRGC. This is how Iran is being governed.
While differences of opinion exist, discussions have consolidated around security institutions, with Mojtaba Khamenei acting as a central convening figure rather than a lone decision maker. Despite sustained military and economic pressure from the Americans and Israel, Iran has shown no signs of fissure or submission nearly nine weeks into the war. There is no evidence of fundamental rifts within the system or meaningful opposition on the streets.
That cohesion suggests that command now sits with the IRGC and security services, which appear to be driving the war rather than merely executing it. A strategic consensus has emerged, avoid a return to total war, preserve leverage, especially over the Strait of Hormuz, and emerge from the conflict politically, economically and militarily stronger.